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CHILD ABUSE: A PERVASIVE PROBLEM OF THE 80s

Samuel M. Davis *

I. DEFINING CHILD ABUSE
One of the chief difficulties in coping with the problems of
child abuse is the lack of a universally accepted definition of the
term "abuse." A pioneering article' written over twenty years ago
by Dr. Henry Kempe and his associates introduced the term
"battered child syndrome" to describe "a clinical condition in
young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally
from a parent or foster parent. ",2 Reference to "battered" children
and "serious physical abuse" denotes a conceptualization of abuse
3
as including only physical trauma with physical manifestations.
In the year following publication of Dr. Kempe's article, Dr.
*Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A., 1966, University of Southern
Mississippi; J.D., 1969, University of Mississippi; LL.M., 1970, University ofVirginia.
1. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemuller& Silver, The Battered ChildSyndrome, 181J. A.M.A.
17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kempe].
2. Id, at 17.
3. Id. at 17-18. Dr. Kempe described the characteristics ofa battered child as follows:
The clinical manifestations of the battered-child syndrome vary widely from those
cases in which the trauma is very mild and is often unsuspected and unrecognized, to
those who exhibit the most florid evidence of injury to the soft tissues and skeleton. In
the former group, the patients' signs and symptoms may be considered to have
resulted from failure to thrive from some other cause or to have been produced by a
metabolic disorder, an infectious process, or some other disturbance. In these patients
specific findings of trauma such as bruises or characteristic roentgenographic changes
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Vincent Fontana and his associates published an article in which
they maintained that the designation "battered child" was too
narrow. 4 According to Fontana, there were additional kinds of
harm suffered by children that should be included in a broader
clinical category. 5 They labeled this new category "maltreatment
6
syndrome. "

Doctors Kempe and Fontana were not the first to realize that
child abuse, however defined, existed. 7 They were, however, the
first to call popular attention to an insidious phenomenon. Since
appearance of their articles in the early 1960s, a virtual flood of
medical literature on the subject has appeared. 8 As a result of
revelations of the occurrence and incidence of child abuse,
legislatures in all fifty states enacted child abuse reporting laws
during a four-year period in the mid-1960s. 9
Most child abuse reporting statutes share certain categorical
provisions, such as defining the persons who must report,
as described below may be misinterpreted and their significance not recognized.
The battered-child syndrome may occur at any age, but, in general, the affected
children are younger than 3 years. In some instances the clinical manifestations are
limited to those resulting from a single episode of trauma, but more often the child's
general health is below par, and he shows evidence of neglect including poor skin
hygiene, multiple soft tissue injuries, and malnutrition. One often obtains a history of
previous episodes suggestive of parental neglect or trauma. A marked discrepency
between clinical findings and historical data as supplied by the parents is a major
diagnostic feature of the battered-child syndrome. The fact that no new lesions, either
of the soft tissue or of the bone, occur while the child is in the hospital or in a protected
environment lends added weight to the diagnosis and tends to exclude many diseases
of the skeletal or hemopoictic systems in which lesions may occur spontaneously or
after minor trauma. Subdural hematoma, with or without fracture of the skull, is, in
our experience, an extremely frequent finding even in the absence of fractures of the
long bones. In an occasional case the parent or parent-substitute may also have
assaulted the child by administering an overdose of a drug or by exposing the child to
natural gas or other toxic substances. The characteristic distribution of these multiple
fractures and the observation that the lesions are in different stages of healing are of
additional value in making the diagnosis.
Id.
4. Fontana, Donovan & Wong, The "MaltreatmentSyndrome" in Children, 269 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1389 (1963).
5. Id. at 1389.
6. Id.
7. For an historical chronicle of earlier efforts to diagnose and publicize the phenomenon among
professionals, see McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1965).
8. See, e.g., M. LYNCH &J. ROBERTS, CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE (1982); E. NEWBERGER,
CHILD ABUSE (1982); THE BATTERED CHILD (R. Heifer & C. Kempe eds. 3d ed. 1980); V. FONTANA
& D. BESHAROV, THE MALTREATED CHILD (1979); THE ABUSED CHILD (H. Martin ed. 1976); V.
FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING (1973); HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY (C.
Kempe & R. Heifer eds. 1972); Kerns, Child Abuse and Neglect: The Pediatrician'sRole, J. CONTIN.
EDUC. PEDIAT., vol. 21, no. 7, at 14 (1979); Kempe, Sexual Abuse, Another Hidden PediatricProblem, 62
PEDIATRICS 382 (1978); Fontana, The Maltreated Child of Our Times, 23 VILL. L. REV. 448 (1978);
Schmitt & Kempe, The Pediatrician'sRole in Child Abuse and Neglect, CURRENT PROBS. PEDIAT., Vol. 5,
no. 5 at 3 (Mar. 1975).
9. Many child abuse reporting statutes are based on model statutes proposed in 1963 by the
Children's Bureau and the Children's Division of the American Humane Association. For accounts
of these legislative developments, see V. DEFRANCIS & C. LUCHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE
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identifying to whom reports must be made, granting civil
immunity to persons reporting in good faith, and waiving the
spousal and physician-patient privileges in such cases. The statutes
vary considerably in detail, however, particularly in their
definitions of what constitutes abuse.
In addition to Dr. Kempe's littany of physical abuse, 10 most
modern statutes include an ever-expanding description of other
kinds of abuse, giving a new and changing meaning to the
definition of abuse from year to year. A number of statutes, for
example, now provide that excessive corporal punishment
constitutes abuse."
Special mention of excessive corporal
punishment was prompted in response to claims that what was
alleged to be abuse was nothing more than normal discipline.1 2 In
fact, the most hotly litigated issue in this area centers on the
difficulty in determining what constitutes normal discipline, that
which parents and others traditionally have been allowed to impose
on children,' 3 and what constitutes excessive discipline amounting to
abuse. 14
Many statutes also include sexual abuse within the general
definition of abuse.' 5 This is due largely to the fact that unless the
act results in physical harm, sexual abuse would not otherwise be
covered by the statutes. 1 6 Another trend is to include sexual
exploitation in the definition of abuse. Florida's child abuse statute,
1970s (rev. ed. 1974); Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 679
(1966); and Paulsen, Parker & Adelmen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws - Some Legislative History, 34 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 482 (1966).
10. See Kempe, supra note 1 and accompanying text. Cf WYo. STAT. S 14-3-202(a) (ii) (B)
(1977). Section 14-3-202(a) (ii) (B) provides: " 'Physical injury' means death or any harm to a child
including but not limited to disfigurement, impairment of any bodily organ, skin bruising, bleeding,
burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma or substantial malnutrition." Id.
11. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE S 11165(e), (g) (West 1982); FiA. STAT. ANN. S 415.503(7) (a)
(West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2053(e) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
5 1012 (f)(i)(B) (McKinney 1983); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3-202(a)(ii) (1977).
12. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Colo. 1982); Bowers v. State, 283 Md.
115, 126-27, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (1978) for a codification of common law principles. Adding infliction
of excessive corporal punishment to the definition of abuse had the effect of restoring the position
held by the common law prior to the adoption of child abuse reporting statutes. The common law
held that parents could impose reasonable discipline on their children without civil or criminal
liability. If the disciplinary measures taken were excessive or "outrageous," however, parents lost
this privilege and could be subjected to civil or criminal liability. Recent legislation seems to have
codified these common law principles.
13. See generally Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 660-63 (1977).
14. A number of statutes have been attacked on vagueness grounds, but for the most part have
been upheld. See, e.g., People v. Jennings, 641 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Colo. 1982) ("cruelly punished" is
not unconstitutionally vague); Bowers v. State, 283 Md. 115, 126-27, 389 A.2d 341, 348 (1978)
("cruel or inhumane treatment" is not unconstitutionally vague). Contra State v. Meinert, 225 Kan.
816, 594 P.2d 232, 233 (1979) ("unjustifiable physical pain" is an unconstitutionally vague term).
15. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 5 11165(b), (g) (West Supp. 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. S
415.503(7)(b) (West Supp. 1984); WYo. STAT. S 14-3-202(a)(ii) (1977).
16. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(b)(7),-(8) (Supp. 1983). Section 35A(b) provides in
part:
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for example, defines abuse as "harm or threatened harm to a
child's physical or mental health or welfare." ' 17 It further defines
"harm" as occurring when a parent or other person responsible for
the child's care "[e]xploits a child, or allows a child to be
exploited." 8
Most states also make sexual exploitation of children a
criminal offense. 19 New York's criminal statute, which prohibits
knowing promotion of a sexual performance by a child under
sixteen, 20 was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in New
York v. Ferber.21 This decision should provide added impetus to
inclusion of sexual exploitation in child abuse statutes.
Finally, a number of states have included emotional or
22
psychological abuse within the general definition of abuse.
Wyoming's statute, for example, defines "mental injury" as
"injury to the psychological capacity or emotional stability of a
child as evidenced by an observable or substantial impairment in
his ability to function within a norral range of performance and
behavior with due regard to his culture." 23 The same definitional
difficulty inherent in the term "excessive corporal punishment''24
25
exists here as well.
The expanding definition of abuse is significant in that, as a
(7) 'Abuse' shall mean any: (A) physical injury or injuries sustained by a child as a
result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of malicious act or acts by any
parent [or custodian] under circumstances that indicate that the child's health or
welfare is harmed or threatened thereby (B)
any sexual abuse of a child, whether
physical injuriesare sustainedor not.
(8) 'Sexual abuse' shall mean any act or acts involving sexual molestation or
exploitation, including but not limited to incest, rape, or sexual offense in any degree,
sodomy or unnatural or perverted sexual practices on a child by any parent, adoptive
parent or other [custodian].
Id. (emphasis added).
17. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 415.503(3) (West Supp. 1984). Florida, like many other states, also
makes sexual exploitation of children a criminal offense. See id. § 827.071. See also infra note 19.
18. FLA. STAT. ANN. S 415.503(7)(c)(West Supp. 1984).
19. See id. 5 827.071. See also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 & n.2 (1982) (the federal
government and forty seven states make sexual exploitation of children a criminal offense).
20. N.Y. PENAL LAW S 263.15 (McKinney 1980).
21. 458 U.S. 747 (1982). The opinion in Ferber summarizes the concern legislatures and the
public have expressed over the growing problem of sexual exploitation of children. New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 749 n.1, 750 n.2, 757-58 (1982),
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 415.503(7)(a), (8) (West Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 14-3202(a)(ii)(A) (1977).
23. WYo. STAT. 5 14-3-202(a)(ii)(A) (1977).
24. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
25. See S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 68 (1971); Areen, Intervention Between Parents and Child. A
Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 933 (1975). The
proposal of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, a joint effort by the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association, was to define emotional abuse symptomatically in
terms well understood by mental health professionals. As stated in the proposal, "[c]ourts should be
authorized to assume jurisdiction [when] . . . a child is suffering serious emotional damage,
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state defines abuse, so it determines the incidence of reported abuse
and the desired level of intervention by the state in the lives of
families. Assume, for example, that states A and B share identical
demographic characteristics in terms of total population, number
of families, family size, and the like. Assume further that State A
defines abuse only in terms of physical abuse, whereas State B
defines abuse as including emotional abuse, sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, and excessive corporal punishment as well. It is
readily apparent that State B will have a statistically greater abuse
problem than State A, even if the same behavior occurs in both
states. The difference will result solely from the difference in how
abuse is defined.
By adopting such a broad definition of abuse, State B has
made a policy decision favoring increased state intervention in the
lives of families as its answer to the countinuing debate over the role
a state should play in regulating family behavior. Contrary to those
advocating the position adopted by State B are persons desiring to
grant families almost total autonomy. This latter group would
prefer a basic policy of nonintervention, except in narrowly defined
26
cases where serious injury has occurred or has been threatened.
This is the position taken by State A.
These two issues, the preferred level of state intervention and
the definition of abuse, are often related. By giving abuse a very
broad definition, a state might be expressing its preference for an
increased level of state intervention. At the same time, however,
the two issues are not necessarily related. A state could, for
example, define abuse in its broadest sense but still express a policy
favoring less state intervention. This latter approach is taken, for
example, in the recently proposed Juvenile Justice Standards
Relating to Abuse and Neglect. 27 In either event, how a state
defines abuse and what level of intervention it prefers are major
factors in determining the statistical incidence of abuse.

evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, or withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward sell
or others, and the child's parents are not willing to provide treatment for him/her." JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT, Standard 2.1(C) (Tent.
Draft 1977 1hereinafter cited asJUVENtLEJJSTCE STANDARDS].

26. For a summary of the arguments for and against intervention, see JUVENILE JUSTICE
supra note 25, Standards 1.1 and commentary, and 2.1 (A)-(F) and commentary.
27. See id. Standard 2.1. Standard 2.1 authorizes intervention in several different sets of
endangering circumstances, including those in which children have suffered or are likely to suffer
serious physical harm, are suffering severe emotional damage, or have suffered sexual abuse. Id. Yet,
as a policy matter, the Standards favor family autonomy and discourage state intervention except in
egregious cases. Id. Standard 1.1 and Commentary.
STANDARDS,
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II. DETERMINING THE INCIDENCE OF ABUSE
While measurement methodology has improved since the first
reporting statutes were enacted in the mid-1960s, accurate
measurement of the incidence of child abuse continues to pose
significant difficulties. A recent summary of the major
measurement research over the last twenty years revealed incidence
estimates ranging from a few hundred to upwards of two and onehalf to four million cases per year. 28 The summary by the National
Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
concluded that, because of the many difficulties in obtaining
accurate data of the national incidence of child abuse and neglect,
little confidence could be placed in even the most recent studies,
which show rates ranging from 40,000 to almost two million cases
29
per year.
Two reports completed since publication of the National
Institute's summary have significantly increased knowledge of the
incidence of child abuse in this country. The methodologies used to
compile the reports differ greatly. The reports' estimates of the
national incidence of child abuse, however, are fairly proximate.
The first report is the National Analysis of Official Child
Neglect and Abuse Reporting. 30 First issued in 1979 and revised in
November 1981, this report is the latest in a series made annually
since 1976 by the American Humane Association for the National
Center on Child Abuse and Neglect. These reports are based on
cases actually reported by official state reporting agencies. The
latest report summarizes information submitted by all fifty states,
the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands. In addition, thirty-one states and two territories furnished
individual case data enabling analysts to report separate figures
according to type of report - abuse or neglect - and separate
figures according to type of maltreatment.
For reporting purposes, "abuse"
is defined as any
"intentional, nonaccidental injury, harm, or sexual abuse inflicted
on a child. ",31 "Neglect" is defined as "the responsible caretaker's
28. NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, A PRELIMINARY
NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT AND TIlE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: TIlE
SIIADOWS OF DISTRESS 9, Table 1(April 1980).
29. Id. at 13 & Table 1. Perhaps the size of the variance between these "tmost recent" studies one based on 1973 data and the other on 1975 data is itself evidence of the serious difficulty in
measurement.
30. TIlE AMERICAN HUMANF ASSOCIATION, DENVER RESEARCII INSTFTF, & THE NATIONAL
CENTER ON CIIILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, NATIONAl ANALYSIS OF OFFICIAL CtItLD NEGLECT AND ABUSE
REPORTING, 1979 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ANALYSIS].
31. Id. at 77. The general reporting category "abuse" is, for analytical purposes, broken down

1985]

CHILD ABUSE

nonprovision of care essential to a child, such as food, clothing,
32
shelter, medical attention, education, or supervision. ,,
Employing these reporting categories and a methodology
based on cases actually reported to official agencies, the report
states that the number of incidents of abuse and neglect in all fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the three territories for 1979
was 711,142. 33 Because all reporting states did not furnish
individual case data, this total could not be subdivided into
separate categories for abuse and neglect. Nor could it be divided
according to type of maltreatment.
Of the total 711,142 cases of abuse and neglect, 296,321 cases,
or forty-two percent of the total cases reported, were reported by
the group of thirty-one states and two territories furnishing
individual case data. 34 Of the total 296,321 cases reported by this
group, 62,014 were reported as cases of abuse, 116,484 were
reported as cases of neglect, and 43,577 were reported as cases
involving both abuse and neglect. 35 The remaining 74,244 cases
were reported as "other," which included cases in which data was
36
missing or in which the type of maltreatment was unspecified.
Further differentiation of the 296,321 cases reported by the
American Humane Association was made according to type of
maltreatment: "major physical injury,'' 37 "minor physical
injury,' '38
"physical
injury unspecified,' ,39
"sexual

further into types of maltreatment. See infra note 37 (major physical injury); infra note 38 (minor
physical injury); infra note 39 (unspecified physical injury); infra note 40 (sexual maltreatment); infra
note 42 (emotional maltreatment); infra note 43 (other maltreatment).
32. NATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 98; infra note 41 (deprivation of necessities).
33. NATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 5.
34. Id. at22, 49.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 22. The report further explains that the "other" category primarily represents "at
risk" cases. Id. at 5. "At risk" is explained as a category "used when maltreatment itself is not
reported, but the report indicates that the child is at risk of being maltreated and therefore needs
attention because of the potential of abuse or neglect." Id. at 79.
The careful reader or the empiricist will note that when the separate figures for abuse, neglect,
abuse and neglect, and "other" shown in the text are combined, they total 296,319 rather than
296,321. This discrepancy is inexplicable.
37. See NATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 95. "Major physical injury" is defined as including
"brain
damage/skull
fracture,
subdural
hemorrhage
or
hematoma,
bone fracture,
dislocation/sprains, internal injuries, poisoning, burns/scalds, severe cuts/lacerations/bruises/welts,
or any combination thereof, which constitute a substantial risk to the life and well-being of the
child." Id.
38. See id. at 96. "Minor physical injury" includes "twisting/shaking, minor cuts/bruises/welts
or any combination thereof which do not constitute a substantial risk to the life and well-being of the
child." Id.
39. See id. at 97. "Unspecified physical injury" is a category used "when the maltreatment is
clearly physical but the specific response cannot be placed accurately into the 'Major Physical' or
'Minor Physical' injury categories." Id.

200
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"deprivation of necessities,''"41 "emotional
and "other maltreatment." 43 The break-down

was as follows:

Type
Major Physical Injury
Minor Physical Injury
Physical Injury (Unspecified)
Sexual Maltreatment
Deprivation of Necessities
Emotional Maltreatment
Other Maltreatment

Percent
4.38%
15.391%
2.46%
5.76 %
63.08%
14.86%
8.87 % 44

Several conclusions drawn in the report from the above data
are self-evident. For example, neglect or, more specifically,
deprivation of necessities constitutes by far the major type of
reported maltreatment. Minor physical injury follows at some
45
distance. This pattern has antecedents in reports for earlier years.
Other conclusions are less obvious on the face of the data. For
example, the maltreatment category showing the most rapid
46
growth in reporting in recent years is sexual abuse.
A word of caution is in order. It would be misleading to think
of the numbers used in this first report as anything more than
approximations, both of the total national incidence of abuse and
neglect and of the incidence according to type of maltreatment.
This is due to the limitations on accurate measurement mentioned
earlier in this article 47 and noted in the report itself. 48 For example,
40. See id. "Sexual maltreatment" includes "the involvement of a child in any sexual act or
situation, the purpose of which is to provide sexual gratification or financial benefit to the
perpetrator; all sexual activity between an adult and a child is considered as sexual maltreatment."

Id.
41. See id. at 98. "Deprivation of necessities" is defined as including "neglecting to provide the
following when able to do so: nourishment, clothing, shelter, health care, education, [and]
supervision or causing failure to thrive." Id.
42. See id. at 99. "Emotional maltreatment" includes "behaviour on the part of the caretaker
which causes low self-esteem in the child, undue fear or anxiety, or other damage to the child's
emotional well-being." Id.
43. See id.at 100. "Other maltreatment" is defined as including "types of maltreatment other
than those mentioned [in supra notes 37-42], including abandonment and tying/close confinement."

Id.
44. Id. at 29. More than one type of maltreatment may have been reported for a single child,
and thus the total for the figures shown is greater than 100 percent.
45. Id. at 50.
46. Id. at 50-51.
47. See supra note 29.
48. NATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 30, at 19, 23.
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the report observes that since collection of reporting data
commenced in 1976, reported cases have increased by seventy-one
percent. 49 The report acknowledges that, because of the lack of any
universal definition of maltreatment and the variation among state
reporting systems, it is impossible to know whether the actual
incidence of abuse and neglect has increased at the same rate. 50
Despite the seventy-one percent increase in reported cases
since 1976, the incremental increase each year has decreased. 51
This might lead to the conclusion that there is a closer correlation
between estimated and actual incidence of abuse and neglect. The
report advises caution here also, adding that the slowing rate of
increase most likely signifies that, as state reporting systems have
become more sophisticated, they are approaching their optimum
capacity for handling reports.52
The second report is the findings of the National Study of the
Incidence and Severity of Child Abuse and Neglect, also prepared
for the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1981.1 3
This study, unlike the first, is based on data collection from
sampling and a program definition of child maltreatment. By using
such a methodology, members of the study sought to avoid some of
the inaccuracies inherent in use of actual reported cases. 54
An underlying premise of this second study is that cases
actually reported to child protective services (CPS) represent only a
portion of the actual incidence of abuse and neglect. This is due to
the fact that there are cases unknown to CPS, but known to other

49. Id. at 19.
50. Id. The same observation can be made of the incidence rates drawn from the individual case
data submitted by the 33 states and territories furnishing such data. For example, the total of
296,321 cases reported by this group represented an increase of 551% over the 1978 total of 191,739
cases. Id. at 23, 49-50. Rather than signifying an actual increase in the incidence of abuse, the
increase was attributed to other factors:
First, while the total number of states [and territories] that submitted case data
remained 33, there was some change in the specific states submitting data. Part of the
increase is due to the fact that some of the 'new' states have larger populations - and
therefore more reports - than was characteristic of those states that did not continue
to provide data for 1979. Another factor is that state reporting systems themselves
continue to develop in technical sophistication, which enables them to receive and
process more reports and subsequently, to submit them to the National Study.
Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 19, 49.

52. Id.
53. U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND. HUMAN SERVICES: NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT, CHILDREN'S BUREAU, ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN YOUTH AND FAMILIES, OFFICE OF
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, STUDY FINDINGS: NATIONAL STUDY OF THE INCIDENCE AND SEVERITY

OF

ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1981) [hereinafter cited as STUDY FINDINGS].
54. Id. at 3.

CHILD

202

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 61 :193

investigatory agencies and professionals.
The study developed a program design and methodology
calculated to tap the "unofficial" sources of information and,
therefore, to produce more realistic estimates of the incidence of
child abuse and neglect. Its central features were: (1) use of a
probability sample of twenty-six counties across the country, (2)
assembly of data from other sources in addition to CPS, and (3)
adoption of a program definition of maltreatment through which
56
the data could be screened .
Employing the program definition of abuse and neglect, and
the sampling methodology, the report arrived at a national
incidence estimate of 651,900 cases of abuse and neglect (or
57
maltreatment) for the one-year study period covering 1979-80.
The report estimated that 1,101,500 cases of maltreatment were
reported to CPS agencies, but of this number, only 470,500 cases
were substantiated by CPS as actually involving maltreatment of
children. 58 The latter figure was further reduced to 212,400,
representing only those cases fitting the study definition of
maltreatment. 5 9 To those 212,400 cases were added an additional
71,400 cases identified by other investigatory agencies, including
police, public health authorities, and the courts. Study agencies
including public schools, hospitals, and mental health and social
service agencies identified another 368,100 cases, for a total of
60
651,900 cases .
The report itself concedes that this estimate is conservative for
several reasons: (1) it is based on a narrow definition of
55. Id. at 2-3. The report also identified two other levels of abuse and neglect unknown to CPS:
cases known to individuals such as the child, the abuser, and friends or neighbors; and cases that are
not known or recognized by anyone as abuse. Included in this latter group are cases in which the
abusing parent or the child does not recognize the behaviour as abusive. The report described as
"very difficult" the task of documenting the incidence of abuse at the latter level, with an "only
slightly less difficult" task at the former level. Due to the concern for accuracy and reliability of
information gathering at these levels, the decision was made not to attempt verification of such data
for inclusion in the report. Id. at 3.
56. Id. The program definition of maltreatment was explained as follows:
A child maltreatment situation is one where, through purposive acts or marked
inattention to the child's basic needs, behaviour of a parent/substitute or other adult
caretaker caused forseeable and avoidable injury or impairment to a child or
materially contributed to unreasonable prolongation or worsening of an existing injury
or impairment.
Id. at 4.
57. Id. at 12, 16, 39, 41-42.
58. Id. at 16, 41. "Substantiated" indicates that a CPS caseworker followed through on the
report by conducting a preliminary investigation, after which the incident was classified as
"founded" or "indicated." Id. at 11 & n.2, 12.
59. Id. at 16, 41. See supra note 56.
60. STUDY FINDINGS supra note 53, at 16, 41-42.
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maltreatment, (2) the non-CPS reporting sources were limited in
range, (3) large and central city agencies were underrepresented in
the non-CPS information gathering, and participation by some of
the "participating" agencies was questionable, and (4) the study
estimate excluded all unsubstantiated CPS cases. 61 Taking these
factors into account, the report conservatively estimates that the
actual incidence of maltreatment is at least 1,000,000 cases per year
62
and quite possibly substantially more than that.
The fact that two studies using different methodologies arrived
at comparable estimates of the national incidence of abuse lends
some credence to each, particularly when the study furnishing the
lower estimate concedes that its total is conservative. 6 3 With
occurrences of maltreatment in these numbers, one might expect
an increasing number of maltreatment cases to reach the courts.
This in fact has happened. Typically the focus in these cases is on
various evidentiary issues including privilege, use of character
evidence, and use of expert testimony. This is particularly true in
sexual abuse cases, which are on the rise. 64 The remainder of this
article is devoted to analysis of these evidentiary issues.
III. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS IN CHILD ABUSE
CASES
The difficulties inherent in prosecution of child abuse cases are
manifold and have been chronicled in greater detail elsewhere. 65
Four particularly troublesome evidentiary problems are deserving
of enhanced consideration and will be discussed in detail in the
61, Id. at 17.
62. Id. at 42.
63. See id. at 11. The second report refers to the "correspondence" between the totals arrived at
in the two studies. Id.
64, See supra text accompanying note 46. If this conclusion was accurate in 1981, it is even more
accurate today. This is due in part to media exposure of sexual abuse, particularly in schools and day
care programs. See, e.g., NEWSWEEK, May 14, 1984, at 30; Id. Aug. 20, 1984, at 44; Id. Sept. 10,
1984, at 19.
65. See, e.g., Comment, Evidentiary Problems in CriminalChild Abuse Prosecutions, 63 GEo. L.J. 257
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Evidentiary Problems]. As the author observed:
The evidence that is available from eyewitnesses is for the most part useless. Even if
the child is alive and mature enough to testify, he may have changed his account of the
incident to match the abuser's version. The victim of child abuse is far more
susceptible to the influence of the alleged abuser than are most victims of other crimes.
While other siblings often are present when the child is abused, they also are easily
influenced and intimidated. Further, the husband-wife privilege may prevent the
other parent from testifying. The defendant, who alone may know how the injury
occurred, usually will maintain that the child was hurt accidentally.
Most of the available evidence in child abuse cases is circumstantial. The jury
must weigh not only the credibility of the witnesses but also the probabilities of the
inferences that the prosecution desires the jury to draw. Therefore, the sufficiency of
the evidence frequently becomes an important question.
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following section of this Article. These are: (1) the competency and
credibility of a child victim as witness, (2) the admissibility of a
child's out-of-court statements, (3) the applicability of the husbandwife and physician-patient privileges, and (4) the use of character
evidence, either in the form of evidence of prior acts of abuse or in
the form of testimony on the "battering parent" profile.
A.

COMPETENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF CHILD WITNESSES

The traditional test for determining a child's competency to
testify is twofold: whether the child understands the obligation to
tell the truth, and whether the child has sufficient capacity to
observe, recollect, and relate. 66 Whether a child possesses such
understanding and testimonial capacity is a decision within the trial
court's discretion, and as with most discretionary decisions, will
67
not be overturned except when abused.
Age is not a controlling factor. 68 Some relatively young
children have been found competent to testify, whereas other
children have not. For example, in State v. Skipper6 9 the court upheld
a defendant's conviction for cruelty to a juvenile over his claim that
two witnesses - seven and five years old - were improperly
allowed to testify. 70 As to the seven-year-old, the court observed
that
[he] answered in the affirmative when asked if he
understood the difference between telling the truth and
not telling the truth, and also when asked if he understood
why he was in court. . . . He was able to handle the
defense [sic] attorney's questions concerning who had
brought him to court, whether anyone had told him what
to say, and whether what he told the judge was what he
actually saw ....71
Of the five-year-old victim, the court noted that he "also answered
Id. at 259-61.
As an example of the inconsistency between accounts by the victim and by the abuser, and of the
influence that parents have over their children, see State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 10-11, 406 P.2d
208,212-13 (1965).
66. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 156 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
67. See, e.g., State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1,454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983); State
v. Skipper, 387 So. 2d 592 (La. 1980).
68. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 156. A recent survey of child competency statutes and rules,
including suggestions for improving the process by which children are allowed to testify, is found in
Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, Competency of Children as Witnesses, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW
125 (J.Bulkley ed. 1981) [hereinafter citied as Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan].
69. 387 So. 2d 592 (La. 1980).
70. State v. Skipper, 387 So. 2d 592 (La. 1980).
71. Id. at 595.
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in the affirmative when asked if he understood why he was in court
and if he knew he had to be truthful (although he did not know
what a "fib" was). He understood the judge wanted him to tell his
story about what happened to him.",7 2 In Pace v. State,7 3 however, a
defendant's conviction for child molestation was reversed on the
ground that the eight-year-old victim was improperly allowed to
74
testify.
Case law indicates that some deficiencies in a child's capacity
72. Id. See State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983). In
Martin, a six-year-old victim was allowed to testify after demonstrating he possessed the capacity for
intelligent recollection and could relate what he had experienced. Id. at 9-10, 454 A.2d at 260. See
also, State v. Pettis, __
R.I. __,
488 A.2d 704 (1985). In Pettis the Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that a fourteen -year-old sexual assault victim could testify even though she was mentally
retarded and experienced difficulty explaining the difference between a falsehood and the truth. Id.
at __
, 488 A.2d at 705. The trial judge concluded that, on balance, "I'm satisfied that in her own
humble way she appreciates the necessity for telling the truth.
Id. at __
, 488 A.2d at 706.
73. 157 Ga. App. 442, 278 S.E.2d 90 (1981).
74. Pace v. State, 157 Ga. App. 442, 443, 278 S.E.2d 90, 92 (1981). The appellate court's use of
the actual transcript best illustrates the perceived deficiencies in the child's competency to testify,
while raising some question about the propriety of its decision. That testimony is quoted as follows:
By Mr.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Sammons [the Assistant District Attorney]:
How old are you, Michelle?
Eight.
Do you know when your birthday is?
Huh-uh.
Q. Do you go to school?
A. Yeah.
Q. Where?
A. I don't know.
Q. Is it here in Dallas?
A. Yes.
Q. What grade are you in?
A. First.
Q. Who lives with you, Michelle?
A. Mama.
Q. Do you know that when you held up your hand just now with this fellow over
here?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you know what telling a story is?
A. Yeah.
Q. What is that?
A. Not supposed to tell lies.
Q. Is it right or wrong to tell a lie?
A. Wrong.
Q. Do you know where we are today?
A. Yeah.
Q. Where are we?
A. At court.
Q. Do you know that fellow up there?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you know what he is called? You can't remember? Do you know where you
are now?
A. At court.
Q What does court do?
The Court:
Q. What does court do?
[A.] Help people.
Q. Do you know what my job is?
[A. ] Huh-uh.
Q. Do you know what Mr. Sammons who is questioning you?
[A.] Yeah.
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are perceived as serious enough to disqualify the child from
testifying, whereas others are perceived as affecting only the
credibility of the child. Thus, the fact that the five-year-old victim

Q. Do you know what his job is? Let me ask you this: You said you knew what it
meant to tell the truth. What happens when you tell an untruth?
By Mr. Sammons:
Q. Is it bad to tell a story, Michelle?
A. Yes.
By Mr. Farless [Defense Counsel]:
Q.'Do you know what would happen to you if you don't tell the truth when
someone asks you a question? Do you?
A. No.
Q. Do you go to church, Michelle?
A. Yeah. But I used to.
Q. How long has it been since you have been to church?
A. I don't know.
Q. Have you heard the expression, I swear to God?
A. Yeah.
Q. What does that mean to you? Michelle, where do you go to church when you
go?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you know how long it has been since you have been to church?
A. I don't know how long. I don't know.
Q. Does your mother ever read from the Bible to you?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Does your grandmother ever read to you from the Bible?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Does anyone ever talk to you about the Bible?
A. Yeah.
Q. Who?
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

The preacher.
Do you know this preacher's name?
Huh-uh.
Have you seen him in quite a while? How long has it been since you have seen

him?
I don't know.
Do you know what the Bible is supposed to be?
I don't know.
Have you ever told fibs, made up stories?
Huh-uh.
Q. You never have had imaginary playmates, make up games to play?
A. Huh-uh.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.... Michelle, when you play, you never make up games to play?
A. Huh-uh.
Q. Do you ever talk to your dolls?
A. Yeah.
Q. Sometimes you pretend they talk back to you? They don't really, do they?
A. Huh-uh.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Have you ever been given a spanking for telling a story?
Huh-uh.
When I say, tell a story, do you know what I mean?
Huh-uh.
IfI told you I could fly without an airplane, would you believe me?
Yeah.

Id. at 442-43, 278 S.E.2d at 91-92.
Examination focusing on church and Sunday School attendance has been questioned as having
"little probative value today in view of changing norms regarding religion" and as having little
likelihood "to shed light on the child's ability to apply moral principles." Melton, Bulkley &
Wulkan, supra note 68, at 128.
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in State v. Skipper "did not know what a 'fib' was ' 75 did not operate
to disqualify him as a witness. Nor did the fact that a six-year-old
victim's memory was vague and limited as to some details operate

to disqualify him as a witness in State v. Martin. 76 In Martin the
Connecticut Supreme Court noted that "[s]uch shortcomings . . .
are not ususual in the testimony of victims of a traumatic

experience and are properly considered as going to the weight of the
testimony rather than its admissibility.'

77

Two observations can be made regarding the foregoing. First,
courts perceive testimony of victims following trauma - such as
abuse - as presenting a unique problem in that the trauma itself
can affect the victim's memory and ability to relate what happened.
In State v. Middleton, 78 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed a rape conviction, holding that expert testimony on

familial child sexual abuse was properly admitted to explain
inconsistencies in the fourteen-year-old victim's statements of what
had happened to her.7 9 The Oregon court, as did the Connecticut
court in Martin, viewed the problem as one affecting weight rather

than admissibility of the evidence. 80
The second observation concerns the argument by some that a
child's testimony should be allowed into evidence for whatever
credence the jury, in light of all the circumstances, may be inclined
to give it." ' While the Connecticut and Oregon courts purport to
follow the traditional test, they may also be perceived as supporting
the more liberal view favoring admissibility. This is at least true

where the deficiencies in the child's understanding or memory are
not excessive.
The problem is one of significant proportions. Prosecutors
frequently are compelled to forego putting the child-victim on the
stand because the child - for reasons of age, embarrassment,
75. 387 So. 2d at 595. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
76. 189 Conn. 1, 454 A.2d 256, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983). Seesupra note 72.
77. State v. Martin, 189 Conn. 1, 10,454 A.2d 256, 260, cert. denied, 461 U.S. 933 (1983).
78. 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983).
79. State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, __,
657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983). Seealso State v. Myers,
359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984). In Myers the Minnesota Supreme Court held that an expert was
pro perly allowed to testify as to traits typically exhibited by a child sexual abuse victim. 359 N.W.2d
at 609. The court also held it proper to permit the expert to assist thejury in evaluating the credibility
of the victim by testifying that she believed the child was telling the truth, where the defense raised
the credibility issue in its cross-examination of the child. Id.
The general use of such expert testimony is discussed in Berliner, Canfield-Blick & Bulkley,
Expert Testimony on the Dynamics of Intra-Family Child Sexual Abuse and Principles of Child Development, in
CIiI.D SEXUAL ABUSE AND TIiE LAW 166 U. Bulkley ed. 1981).
80. Middleton, 294 Or. at
657 P.2d at 1221.
81. See, e.g., McCoRMICK, supra note 66, at 156. The Federal Rules of Evidence adopt this
aplproach of allowing the jury to give credence to a child's testimony by doing away with all
disqualifications. See FED. R. EviD. 601. A recent report declares that 13 states have adopted the
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trauma, awe, or shyness - will not pass the scrutiny required for
testimonial competence. 2 In cases already noted for their paucity
of evidence, the loss of a child's testimony has been devastating. 3
The problem admits of only two solutions.
First, the prosecutor can seek to use the child's extrajudicial
statements under existing or specially formulated exceptions to the
hearsay rule as discussed below. Second, steps can be taken to
reduce the trauma faced by the child-victim, permitting the child's
testimony to be received in evidence. Both kinds of reforms have
been suggested recently. One commentator has suggested the use
of youth examiners who would examine the child and present the
child's statements in court, in camera examination of the child, use
of a "child's courtroom" with the defendant "present" behind a
one-way mirror, use of videotaped depositions, and closure of the
courtroom to all persons whose presence is not necessary during the
taking of the child's testimony.8 4 The writer expresses serious
doubt, however, whether any of these measures will pass
constitutional muster in terms of the defendant's right to
confrontation and the right of the public and press to attend the
proceedings. 5
Another commentator has proposed a Model Act to facilitate
the use of a child's statement. 6 The Act would provide for
appointment of a specially trained attorney as Child Hearings
Officer (CHO) who would examine the child, videotaping of the
initial interview for admission at trial, in-court questioning by the
judge or CHO rather than defense counsel if necessary to protect
the child's psychological health, giving of testimony in a special,

approach of the Federal Rules by statute or by rule. Melton, Bulkley & Wulkan, supra note 68, at 127
&n.20.
82. See, e.g., Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3539 (1984). In
Goldade the prosecutor was forced to seek admission of the child's extrajudicial statements when the
child, a four-and-one-half-year-old, was declared incompetent to testify as a witness. Id. at 723-24.
The psychological problems experienced by child victims of sexual offenses and the evidentiary
problems associated with use of their statements are chronicled in Parker, The Rights of Child
Witnesses: Is The Court A ProtectorOr Perpetrator?17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 643, 648-53 (1982) thereinafter
cited as Parker].
The victim may even experience a change of heart about testifying. As an example of perhaps a
court's overreaction to this dilemma, see State v. DeLong, 456 A.2d 877, 880-82 (Me. 1983)
(affirming the contempt conviction of a fifteen-year-old sexual abuse victim for refusing to testify
against her father).
83. For a discussion of cases concerning the effects of missing child-victim testimony, see
Comment, Evidentiary Problems, supra note 65, at 259-61; Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1745-46 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Note, ChildHearsay].
84. Melton, ProceduralReforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex Offense Proceedings, in CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW 184, 185-93 (J. Bulkley ed. 1981).
85. Id.
86. Parker, supra note 82, at 664-73.
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smaller room in the company of a parent or other friendly adult,
and use of depositions in the event a smaller courtroom is
unavailable. 87 Unlike the first writer, after thorough analysis the
second commentator foresees no constitutional infirmities with use
of these procedures in terms of the defendant's rights to
confrontation, 88 compulsory process, 89 due process, 90 or public
trial. 9 1 Some of these issues will be discussed in the following
section.
B.

EVIDENCE OF CHILD's EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS

With the problems attending use of a child-victim's in-court
testimony, 92 a number of courts have allowed evidence of the
child's out-of-court statements to be used under various exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Commonly used exceptions include the
spontaneous exclamation exception, 93 the statement of physical
condition exception, 94 a specially formulated "tender years"
exception, 95 and the residual exception 96 often allowed under

hearsay rules. 97 An example is the Wyoming case of Goldade v.
State.98 In Goldade the prosecutor was forced to seek admission of the
four-and-a-half-year-old victim's extraj udicial statements under an
ex eption to the hearsay rule because the trial court ruled that she
was incompetent to testify as a witness. 9 9 The trial court allowed a
87. Id. at 653, 665-70.
88. Id. at 686-702.
89. Id. at 703-08.
90. Id. at 708-12.
91. Id. at 712-16. The conclusion that no constitutional infirmities exist was drawn before the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596
(1982). In Globe Newspaper the Court held unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute requiring
mandatory closure of the courtroom during testimony of a child-victim in a sexual offense trail.
According to the Court, the Massachusetts statute was violative of the first amendment right of the
public and press to free access to criminal trials. Id. at 610-11. Of course, Globe Newspaper does not
address the issue of closure of noncriminal trials such as child abuse proceedings in juvenile court.
Moreover, even in criminal trials, Globe Newspaper does not prohibit closure per se, but only
mandatory closure in a certain class of cases. The Court recognized that closure might be
appropriate in some cases, to be decided on a case-by-case basis. 457 U.S. at 607-09.
92. See supra notes 79, 82, and accompanying text.
93. A discussion of the cases as well as a criticism of the spontaneous exclamation exception in
child-victim cases is found in Note, Child Hearsay, supra note 83, at 1753-59.
94. See, e.g., Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3539 (1984).
95. Note, Child Hearsay, supra note 83, at 1759-61.
96. Id. at 1761-63. A recent case rejecting admissibility of a child's extrajudicial statements
under the excited utterance and physical condition exceptions, and refusing to judicially create a
residual exception in light of the legislature's explicit rejection of such an exception, is W.C.L. v.
People, 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
97. The Federal Rules of Evidence, after enumerating specific exceptions to the hearsay rule,
also create a residual exception under which statements not covered within the enumerated
exceptions but having the same guarantees of reliability can be admitted into evidence. FED. R.
EvtD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
98. 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3539 (1984).
99. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 3539 (1984).
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pediatrician and a nurse to testify that the child had told them her
mother had injured her, over the defendant's objection that their
testimony constituted hearsay. 0 0 On appeal the defendant's
conviction for child abuse was affirmed, the Wyoming Supreme
Court holding that the testimony was properly admitted under the
hearsay exception covering statements made to a physician for
purposes of diagnosis and treatment.' 0 ' The court recognized that
ordinarily statements of fault are not admissible under this
exception because they do not relate to diagnosis or treatment.
Here, however, the physician's testimony clearly revealed that he
was not simply treating bruises on the child's face but was
attempting to diagnose the injuries as a case of child abuse, a
diagnosis to which identity of the person causing the injuries was a
102
pertinent fact.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has been sensitive to the
special evidentiary needs in child abuse cases and has adopted a
liberal view of admissibility. 10 3 In fact, the court in Goldade
acknowledged that it
has pursued a policy in child homocide cases of
developing rules which ultimately will assist in protecting
the innocent victims of child abuse. . . . [N]o apology is
necessary for this policy. Because of the manifest need to
protect the most helpless members of our society from
violence on the part of others, the policy is both necessary
04
and proper. 1
Such a liberal view is not always shared, however. For
example, in W. C.L. v. People'05 the Colorado Supreme Court held
that statements of a four-year-old victim of sexual assault were
improperly admitted because they did not fall within any of the
enumerated exceptions to the hearsay rule, nor could their
admission be justified under a "residual exception" that does not
exist in Colorado. 0 6 While the court was sympathetic with the
100. Id. at 723-24.
101. Id. at 725-27.
102. Id. at 725-26. The court also gave considerable weight to its function in this case, which it
perceived as pursuing "the transcendant goal of addressing the most pernicious social ailment which
afflicts our society, family abuse, and more specifically, child abuse." Id. at 725.
103. See, e.g., Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802, 811 (Wyo. 1980) (evidence of prior acts of abuse
admissible to prove identity and intent or reckless disregard of consequences).
104. Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d at 727 (citations omitted).
105. 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
106. W.C.L. v. People, 685 P.2d 176, 181-83 (Colo. 1984). As in Goldade, the four-year-old
child in W.C.L. was declared incompetent as a witness when called to testify because she did not
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argument presented for admissibility under the residual exception,
it was unwilling to give judicial recognition to such an exception
when the legislature had considered but rejected a proposed
residual exception in adopting the rules of evidence. 107
The contrast in result between these two cases is symptomatic
of a problem that has caused some to criticize the judicial practice
of analyzing admissibility of children's extrajudicial statements in
accordance with traditional hearsay exception dogma. 108 Routine,
rigid adherence to traditional requirements is said to force a harsh
result in most instances because it fails to take into account
significant perceptual differences between children and adults. In
many cases, especially those in which sexual abuse is alleged, these
differences render statements of children more reliable than those
of adults. The result is loss of a substantial proportion of probative
evidence that should be admitted. 109
Perhaps in response to such concerns, some states have
recently enacted new exceptions to the hearsay rule applicable in
criminal prosecutions for sexual abuse of children.1 10 Washington's
statute, for example, provides that statements made by a child
describing any act of sexual conduct with or on the child are
admissible in criminal proceedings. 1 1 I The court must find that the
statement is sufficiently reliable before invoking the exception, and
2
the child must either testify at the proceeding or be unavailable. 11
know what "to tell the truth" meant. Id. at 178 & n. 1. A statement to the child's aunt identifying the
child's uncle as the perpetrator did not, in the court's judgment, fit within the excited utterance
exception. Id. at 179-83. Nor did a similar statement made to a physician fit within the medical
diagnosis exception. Id. at 181-83.
107. Id.
108. See, e.g., Note, Child Hearsay, supra note 83, at 1755-58, 1761, 1763.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., KAN. STAt. ANN
60-460 (dd) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120
(Supp. 1985).
111. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.
60-460(dd) (1983); WASh. REV. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1985). The Washington statute provides:

§

9A.44.120

A statement made by a child when under the age of ten describing any act of
sexual contact performed with or on the child by another, not otherwise admissible by
statute or court rule, is admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings . . . if:
(1) The court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury that
the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of
reliability; and
(2) The child either:
(a) Testifies at the proceedings; or
(b) Is unavailable as a witness: Provided, that when the child is unavailable as a
witness, such statement may be admitted only if there is corroborative evidence of the
act.
A statement may not be admitted under this section unless the proponent of the
statement makes known to the adverse party his intention to off r the statement and
the particulars of the statement sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to provide
the adverse part), with a fair opporunity to prepare to meet the statement.
Id. (emphasis original).
112. Id.
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This new Washington statute has been hailed as a positive
innovation that allows courts greater discretion to consider
alternative indicia of trustworthiness as opposed to limiting
consideration to spontaneity. This allows courts to consider the
special characteristics of children that require differential
treatment, as well as the special need for this type of evidence in
sexual abuse cases. 13 Moreover, the new statute relieves courts
from the often farcical task of distorting traditional hearsay
analyses to bring children's statements within the confines of
existing hearsay exceptions. 114 The claim is also made that the
statute accomplishes these worthy objectives without infringing on
the defendant's constitutional rights. 115
In fact, both the Washington and Kansas statutes have been
upheld against the claim that they violate the defendant's
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. 1 6 Both
courts upheld the statutes under the test announced in Ohio v.
Roberts. 117 Under Roberts the confrontation clause is not violated if
the declarant is either present or shown to be unavailable, and the
out-of-court statement is shown to be reliable." 8
Although the Kansas statute is not so limited, Washington's
new hearsay exception is applicable only to sexual abuse cases. This
means that in other kinds of abuse cases, admissibility of a child's
out-of-court statements still depend on application of traditional
hearsay analysis under recognized exceptions or a residual
exception. Nevertheless, because sexual abuse cases constitute the
bulk of those in which problems with a child's in-court testimony
are likely to arise, 1 9 the new statute is a welcome legislative
response to a problem confronted by courts alone, sometimes with
113. Note, Child Hearsay, supra note 83, at 1764-65; Comment, Sexual Abuse of Children Washington's New Hearsay Exception, 58 WASH. L. REV. 813, 819-20 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Washington's New Hearsay Exception].
114. Comment, Washington's New Hearsay Exception, supra note 113, at 817-19.
115. Note, Child Hearsay, supra note 83, at 1765-66; Comment, Washington's New Hearsay
Exception, supra note 113, at 825-29. The latter commentary concludes that under some
circumstances the new statute could be applied in such a way that tne defendant's rights would be
compromised. Comment, Washington's New Hearsay Exception, supra note 113, at 825-27. Courts are
therefore urged to examine specific applications of the exception on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether the right to confrontation has been violated. Id.
116. State v. Ryan, 103 Wash.2d 165, 691 P.2d 197 (1984); State v. Myatt, 237 Kan. 17, 697
P.2d 836 (1985). See State v. Slider, 38 Wash. App. 689, 688 P.2d 538 (1984) (the legislature did not
overstep its authority or violate the confrontation clause by enacting a statute that permitted
admission of statements from a two-and-one-half-year-old child); State v. Pendelton, 10 Kan. App.
2d 26, 690 P.2d 959 (1984) (statutory exception to hearsay rule did not violate the confrontation
clause because the judge must first determine that the child is unavailable by way of disqualification
and that the statements sought to be admitted are reliable).
117. 448 U.S. 56(1980).
118. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
119. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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unsatisfactory results, for a number of years.

C.

WAIVER OF PRIVILEGES

1. Spousal Privilege
Difficulty in obtaining the testimony of one parent against the
other has been a recurring problem in child abuse cases.1 20 Two
types of husband-wife privilege - one a true privilege and the
other a competence rule - occasionally have been invoked to
preclude admissibility of an otherwise valuable source of probative
evidence. The first type of privilege is not a "privilege" at all, but
rather is a remnant of the common law rule that declared both
spouses incompetent to testify for or against the other. Eventually
spouses were permitted to testify for the other as the
disqualification for interest gave way to a rule that allowed interest
to be considered on the issue of credibility. The rule that kept
disqualified spouses from testifying against each other remained,
however, at least in criminal cases, in the form of a testimonial
"privilege" of the spouse against whom the testimony was offered
to prevent the other from testifying. Many of these testimonial
privilege rules have been altered today to declare the witnessspouse the holder of the privilege, thus allowing a willing spouse to
testify against the other. 2 '
Even at common law certain exceptions were recognized. For
example, where one spouse was charged with a crime committed
against the other, or against the child of either or both, the privilege
could not be invoked.1 22 Today the practical effect of the latter
exception is that in either a civil or criminal case alleging parental
abuse of a child, the other spouse is free to give adverse
testimony.12 3 This is not to say, however, that application of the
testimonial privilege has always been even. The exception is
sometimes allowed in both civil and criminal cases, 124 but at other
12 5
times is allowed only in criminal cases alleging child abuse.
Moreover, at times the exception has been construed so narrowly
that it is applicable only where one spouse is charged with abuse of
120.'See generally Comment, Evidentiary Problems, supra note 65, at 260.
121. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 161-62. See generallyTrammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40

(1980).
122.
123.
124.
125.

MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 162 & n. 11.
See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.11 (1979).
See, e.g., CAL. EVlD. CODE S 972(d), (e)(1) (1966).
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. S 595.022(b) (1984).
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the other spouse. Under such a construction, spousal testimony
12 6
is effectively precluded in cases alleging parental abuse of a child.
In any event, regardless of how the statute creating the privilege
might be worded, any question over its scope may be alleviated if
the child abuse reporting statute provides for waiver of any
127
privilege that otherwise might be applicable.
The second type of spousal privilege is the marital
communications privilege. Unlike the first type, it does not seek to
disqualify a spouse from testifying at all, but rather to preserve the
confidentiality of communications between spouses. Thus, while
one spouse is competent to testify against the other, he or she is not
free to testify as to any confidential communications made by the
other spouse. The holder of the privilege is the communicating
spouse.

12 8

With this true privilege, also, an exception is sometimes
provided to permit testimony even as to confidential
communications in child abuse cases. 129 Additionally, as with the
testimonial privilege, if the child abuse reporting statute contains a
waiver provision, it operates as a waiver of the marital
communications privilege.

130

Two recent cases indicate how these privileges are being
applied in child abuse cases today. In Daniels v. State13 1 the trial
court's order holding a wife in contempt for failure to testify against
her husband on a child abuse charge presented to the grand
jury was affirmed. 13 2 The wife's refusal to testify was based on her
claim of spousal privilege.1 3 3 Alaska recognizes both types of
privilege discussed above - the testimonial privilege, which is
granted to the spouse against whom the testimony is offered, 13 4 and
the marital communications privilege.13 5 With respect to both,
however, the rule creating the privileges provides that neither is
applicable to a case in which one spouse is charged with "[a] crime
against the person or the property of the other spouse or of a child
of either." ' 13

6

In addition, the Alaska child abuse statutes also

126. See, e.g., State v. McGonigal, 89 Idaho 177, 403 P.2d 745 (1965); State v. Riley, 83 Idaho
346, 362 P.2d 1075 (1961). The Idaho statutes were later amended to extend the exception to child
abuse cases. See IDAHO CODE S§ 9-203(1), 19-3002(2) (Supp. 1984).
127. See infra notes 137, 147 and accompanying text.
128. For the distinction between the two husband-wife privileges and their origins, see
MCCORMICK, supra, note 66, at 188-91.
129. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 90.504(3)(b)(West 1979).
130. See infra notes 137, 147 and accompanying text.
131. 681 P.2d 341 (Alaska App. 1984).
132. Daniels v. State, 681 P.2d 341, 342 (Alaska App. 1984).
133. Id. Rule 505(b)(1).
134. ALASKA R. EVID. 505(aX1).

135. Id.
136. Id. 505(a)(2)(D)(i), (b)(2)(A).

19851

CHILD ABUSE

provide for waiver of the husband-wife privilege in child abuse
1 37
proceedings.
The only issue in Danielscentered on construction of the word
"child" in the part of the rule creating the exception. Specifically
the Daniels court discussed whether the exception extends to a case
in which the child is a foster child. Two reasons supported the
court's decision that it did. First, current research supports the
view that spousal privileges should be construed narrowly, since
they prevent disclosure of probative evidence. 1 38 Secondly, the
court determined that the privilege must yield in any event to the
1 39
policy of prevention of child abuse.
In the other case, People v. Corbett,' 40 the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of charges against the
defendant husband.1 4 1 At his preliminary hearing, the defendant
was able to prevent his wife from testifying against him on a charge
of sexual assault on a child by claiming the husband-wife privilege.
Colorado's testimonial privilege, like Alaska's, is held by the
spouse against whom the testimony is offered. 14 2 An exception is
allowed under the privilege statute itself, but only "[in] a criminal
action or proceeding for a crime committed by one [spouse] against
the other. "1143 The court observed that it was a moot point whether
any crime committed by one spouse should be broadly construed as
a crime "against the other," because the child abuse statutes
provide that the husband-wife privilege cannot be claimed in a
44
child abuse proceeding. 1
These cases are significant in that they indicate the tendency of
courts to look to the child abuse statutes themselves, as well as the
statutes or rules creating the privileges, when questions arise
concerning the possible application of spousal privilege to child
abuse cases. The cases also indicate the further tendency to give a
somewhat narrower scope to spousal privilege than has
traditionally been given. The same is not necessarily true with
respect to waiver of the physician-patient privilege in such cases.

137. ALASKA STAT. S 47.17.060 (1984).
138. Daniels, 681 P.2d at 343-45 (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980)). Cf
State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1984) (a contrary result with respect to the physicianpatient privilege). See also infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
139. Daniels, 681 P.2d at 345.
140. 656 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1983).
141. People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687, 689 (Colo. 1983).
142. COLO. REV. STAT. 5 13-90-i07(l)(a)(Supp. 1984).
143. Id.
144. Corbett, 656 P.2d at 688-89. The pertinent provision of the child abuse statute is COLO.
REV. STAT. 5 19-10-112 (1978). Cf State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269, 280 (Alaska App. 1984) (a similar
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2. Physician-PatientPrivilege
In addition to spousal privilege, a number of states have
eliminated the physician-patient privilege in child abuse
proceedings. 14 5 In two recent cases, however, such statutes were
read very narrowly, casting some doubt on the scope to be accorded
the physician-patient privilege in future cases, as well as the
breadth of application of any waiver of the privilege.
In the first case, State v. R.H. ,146 a clinical psychologist was
subpoenaed to appear and bring certain of his records before a
grand jury investigating charges of sexual abuse brought against
one of his patients. He sought and obtained an order quashing the
subpoena on the ground that disclosure would violate the
psychotherapist-patient privilege recognized under the rules of
the Alaska
evidence. 147 In the State's interlocutory appeal,
14 8
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.
The pertinent provision of Alaska's child abuse reporting
statutes provides that the physician-patient privilege is not
applicable to a child abuse proceeding "related to a report made
under this chapter." 49 This language is very similar to that found
in other such statutes. 50 The court held that the provision
eliminating the physician-patient privilege applies only in civil
child protective proceedings brought under the child abuse
reporting statutes, and is not applicable to criminal proceedings
alleging child abuse. The court based this decision on policy
5
considerations and its reading of legislative intent. ' 1
The Alaska court's decision in this case is puzzling in view of
its earlier decision in Daniels v. State' 52 involving a similar refusal to
testify, but based on spousal rather than physician-patient
privilege. In Daniels the same statute that eliminates both privileges
provision eliminating the physician-patient privilege held inapplicable to criminal prosecutions for
child abuse). See infra notes 146-64 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (1984); COLO. REV. STAT. S 19-10-112 (1978); Oa.
REv. STAT. S 418.775(1) (1983); VA. CODE 5 63.1-248.11 (1980).
146. 683 P.2d 269 (Alaska App. 1984).
147. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d 269, 271 (Alaska App. 1984). See ALASKA R. EVio. 504(b)
(recognizing the physician-patient privilege).
148. State v. R. H., 683 P.2d at 272.
149. ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.060 (1984).
150. See statutes cited in supra note 145. Virginia's statute provides, "[ijn any legal proceeding
resultingfrom thefiling of any report or complaint pursuant to this chapter, the physician-patient and husbandwife privileges shall not apply." VA. CODE § 63.1-248.11 (1980) (emphasis added). Similarly, the
Orcgon statute provides, "[in the case of abuse of a child . . . the physician-patient privilege . . .
shall not be ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's abuse, or the cause thereof, in any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to [the reporting statute]." OR. REV. STAT.
418.775(l) (1983) (emphasis added).
151. State v. R.H., 683 P.2d at 280.
152. Daniels, 681 P.2d 341 (Alaska App. 1984). See supra notes 131-39 and accompanying text.
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in proceedings "related to a report made under this chapter,"1 53
was held applicable to a criminal prosecution for child abuse. Thus,
the trial court's decision holding the wife in contempt for failure to
give testimony against her husband before the grand jury was
affirmed, 5 4 in part because the spousal privilege must yield to the
policy of prevention of child abuse.' 5 5 Other courts confronted with
the same issue likewise have concluded that elimination of the
spousal privilege is applicable in criminal prosecutions for child
abuse.

56

In State v. Andring, 5 7 the second case narrowly construing
statutory elimination of the physician-patient privilege in child
abuse proceedings, the defendant was charged with criminal sexual
abuse. The state sought discovery of his medical records and
statements made by him to personnel in a psychotheraphy program
in which he voluntarily participated. The trial court denied the
state's motion to discover statements made by the defendant in oneon-one sessions with psychotheraptists, but granted discovery of
statements he had made in group therapy sessions. The issue of the
scope of the physician-patient privilege was certified to the
appellate court for interlocutory review. 158
The applicable state statute provides that, notwithstanding the
physician-patient privilege,1 59 "[n]o evidence regarding the child's
injuries shall be excluded in any proceeding arising out of the
neglect or physical or sexual abuse.'

160

The purpose of the latter

provision, according to the court, is to encourage full, unfettered
reporting of child abuse. The court found this to be consistent with
the purpose of the reporting statutes themselves - to protect
children rather than to punish the wrongdoer. Thus, prior to the
reporting of abuse, the policy underlying the medical privilege
must yield to the policy of protecting children. Once abuse is
discovered through required reporting, however, the purpose of
child protection has been served, and full disclosure of confidential
physician-patient communications is no longer required.
Therefore, the court construed the statute as a limitation on, but
153. ALASKA STAT. 5 47.17.060 (1984).
154. Daniels, 681 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska App. 1984). See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155. Daniels, 681 P.2d at 345. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., People v. Corbett, 656 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1983); State v. Suttles, 287 Or. 15, 597
P.2d 786 (1979). In these states the statutes eliminating the spousal and physician-patient privilege
contain language similar to that in the Alaska statute, indicating that the abrogation applies to "any
judicial proceeding resulting from a report made pursuant to [the child abuse reporting statute]."
OR. REV. STAT. S 418.775(l)(1983). Seealso COLO. REV. STAT. S 19-10-112 (1978).
157. 342 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. 1984).
158. State v. Andring, 342 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1984).
159. See MINN. STAT. § 595.021(d) (1984) (the physician-patient privilege).
160. Id. S626.556.
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not a complete abrogation of the privilege. Only evidence required
to be reported under the child abuse reporting statute - the
"identity of the child, the parent, guardian, or other person
responsible for . . . [the child's] . . . care, the nature and extent of

the child's injuries, and the name and address of the reporter" may be admitted.

161

Such a construction by the court gives a very broad scope to
the physician-patient privilege itself, which is contrary to the trend
in recent years to narrow the scope of the privilege. 162 Perhaps this
decision and the Alaska court's decision in State v. R.H. are
explained largely by the fact that both involved confidential
communications between psychotherapists and their patients. The
psychotheraist-patient relationship, with its greater need for
encouragement of communication, has become the last strong
haven for a privilege that in recent years has struggled for
survival.

63

1

Still, one might question whether the policy underlying

the physician-patient privilege should be accorded greater weight
4
than the policy underlying spousal privilege. 16
D.

USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE

An axiom of evidence law is that evidence of a person's
character is inadmissible to show his propensity to act in
accordance with that character.1 65 Several exceptions to the general
rule of exclusion have been recognized. Thus, under well-defined
circumstances, character evidence may properly be used to prove
that a person acted in conformity with his character on a particular
occasion. 1 66 Moreover, evidence may be admitted for purposes
other than propensity to act in a certain way. For example,
161. Andring, 342 N.W.2d at 132-33. The child abuse reporting statute, from which the
quotation is taken, is MINN. STAT. S 626.556(7) (1984). The current language is slightly different
from the statute in effect at the time of the court's decision.
162. Not all states recognize a general physician-patient privilege. MCCORMICK, supra note 66,
at 184, 244 & n.5. In those that do, the privilege is noted for the kinds of cases to which it does not
apply, and the ease with which it can be waived. Id. at 254-58. Moreover, the traditional underlying
rationale of the privilege - that it is necessary to encourage communication by patients to their
physicians - has been questioned. Id. at 244. The latter concern led to rejection of a general
physician-patient privilege when the Federal Rules of Evidence were proposed. See PROPOSED FED.
R. EVID. 504 advisory committee note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 241-42.
163. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 244-45. Some jurisdictions do not recognize a general
physician-patient privilege but do recognize a psychotherapist-patient privilege. Id. at 245 & nn. 9 &
10.
164. All states recognize some form of spousal privilege, whereas most, but not all states
recognize a physician-patient privilege. Id. at 183-84. See supra note 162.
165. McCORMICK, supra note 66, at 554. See also FED. R. EVID. 404(a). Rule 404(a) states the
general rule: "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion .... " Id.
166. FED. R. Evt. 404(b). The accused in a criminal case may offer evidence of his good
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character evidence is admissible to prove identity, intent, motive,
167
knowledge, absence of mistake or accident, and the like.
Recent cases indicate that the use of character evidence in
child abuse proceedings is a recurrent issue. The cases are generally
of two types. In the first type of case, character evidence is used for
permissible purposes such as evidence of intent, identity, and
absence of mistake or accident. The second type of case includes
those in which expert testimony on the "battering parent
syndrome" is received, along with evidence that the defendant fits
the profile, as evidence of the defendant's guilt. Each kind of case
will be discussed in turn.
Both Alaska and Wyoming have adopted rules of evidence
modeled after the Federal Rules. Thus, each state excludes
evidence of character if offered to show propensity, 168 but allows
such evidence if offered for some other purpose, such as to prove
identity, intent, or motive. 169 In recent decisions, however, courts
in the two states have reached different results in applying these
similar rules.
In Grabill v. State170 the Wyoming Supreme Court held that
character to show that he is not a person with the propensity for crime. Once the defendant offers
such evidence, the prosecution may offer rebuttal evidence to show a criminal disposition.
MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 566-70; FED. R. EvIo. 404(a)(1). The accused may also offer evidence
of a pertinent character trait of the victim in a criminal case, and the prosecution may offer rebuttal
4 4
2
evidence. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 571-74; FED. R. EVID. 0 (aX ). Moreover, in a homicide
case in which the victim is alleged to have been the aggressor, the prosecution may open the door by
initially offering evidence of the victim's character for peacefulness. Id. Character evidence is also
admissible for the purpose of impeaching a witness's credibility. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 574;
FED: R. EVID. 404(a)(3).
Character evidence is also admissible in a case in which character is "in issue," i.e., in.which a
person's character or a trait of his character is an element of a claim or defense, as in a libel suit in
which truth is alleged as a defense. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 551-53; FED. R. EvIo. 405(b).
167. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 557-65. See also, FED. R. EVD. 404(b). Rule 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Id. The word "may" is a reference to the admonition of Rule 403 that "[allthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substanitally outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading thejury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403. Thus, evidence falling
within one of the categories enumerated in Rule 404(b) is not automatically admissible but is subject
to the balancing test set forth in Rule 403. See FED. R. EvIo. 404(b) advisory committee notes, 56
F.R.D. 183, 218, 219. Decisions on admissibility are left to the trial court's discretion, and courts are
accorded considerable leeway in the exercise of this discretion. MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 544-48.
For an example of a decision in which the appellate court was unwilling to say that the trial court had
abused its discretion in admitting character evidence for a permissible purpose, see the discussion of
Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980), inja notes 170-74 and accompanying text.
168. ALASKA R. EvIn. 404(a); Wyo. R. EviD. 404(a). For the text of Federal Rule 404(a), see
supra note 165.
169. ALASKA R. EvID. 404(b); Wyo. R. EvID. 404(b). For the text of Federal Rule 404(b), see
supra note 167.
170. 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980).
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evidence of prior misconduct was properly admitted by the trial
court. t7' According to the court, prior incidents involving other
children of the appellant were admissible to prove the identity of the
appellant as the criminal agent. 1 72 Such evidence might also be
admitted to prove intent or recklessness, each of which is an
element of the crime of child abuse. 1 73 Admissibility of character
evidence on such issues, the court conceded, must be balanced
against the admonition in Wyoming Rule of Evidence 403 that
prejudicial effect may outweigh probative value. In this kind of
case, however, the need for evidence tending to establish the
identity of the perpetrator outweighs any prejudicial effect likely to
be occasioned by its admission. Therefore, the court was unable to
say that admission of the evidence of prior misconduct was an
74
abuse of discretion. 1
The Grabill court concluded that appellant's denial of guilt
made intent an issue in the case, and this conclusion has been
sharply criticized.' 75 Likewise, much criticism flows from the
holding that evidence of appellant's prior misconduct tended to
prove identity, 176 and that the need for evidence in child abuse
cases justified admission of otherwise prejudicial evidence.' 77 It has
been argued that the only purpose evidence of prior misconduct
served in Grabill was to show the appellant's propensity for
violence. This is precisely the kind of evidence intended to be
excluded under Rule 404(b). 1 78 Because Rule 404(b) first states a

171. Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802,813-14 (Wyo. 1980).
172. Id. at 808-11. The evidence conflicted regarding who - the appellant or the child's mother
- caused the child's injuries. Id. Therefore, identity was an issue in the case. Id. Implicit in
appellant's testimony was a denial that he was the agent of the child's harm. Id. at 809-10.
173. Id. at 808-11. Se Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-503 (Supp. 1983). Section 6-2-503 provides:
a person is guilty of child abuse .. if:
(i) the actor is an adult or is at least six (6) years older than the victim; and
(ii) the actor intentionally or recklessly inflicts upon a child under the age of
sixteen (16) years:
(A) Physical injury as defined [elsewhere]; or
(B) Mental injury as defined [elsewhere].
...

Id.
174. Grabill, 621 P.2d at 810-11. See also State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983). In Tanner
the court also emphasized the need of evidence, especially in child abuse cases, as a factor to be
considered in the balancing process. 675 P.2d at 547.

175. See Case Note, Evidence, Child Abuse - Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence: What
Protection is Left After Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo. 1980)?, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 769, 77780 (1981)
176.
177.
178.

[hereinafter cited as Case Note, EvidenceI .
Id. at 781-82.
Id. at 783-85.
Id. at 779-80, 782.
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prohibition' 7 9 and then creates exceptions, 8 0 judges should be
especially vigilant in employing the balancing test of Rule 40381 to
82
insure that the exceptions do not in fact become the rule. 1
One critic of the Grabill decision offers instead the Alaska
Supreme Court's decision in Harvey v. State8 3 as an example of the
proper degree of caution. 8 4 In Harvey the appellant's conviction
for negligent homicide of an eighteen-month-old child was reversed
8 5
because evidence of prior misconduct was improperly admitted.
The court considered and rejected several theories advanced in
favor of admitting evidence that the appellant had severely beaten
another child on a previous occasion. The trial court admitted this
evidence on the basis that it showed malice and intent. Appellant
argued that neither intent nor malice was an element of either
offense with which he was charged.1 8 6 The State's response was that
the evidence was properly admitted to establish general criminal
intent. The supreme court rejected the State's argument, fearing
that a contrary decision would mean evidence of prior misconduct
would be admissible in every case charging a felony to show general
criminal intent. The exception would thus swallow up the rule. 8 7
Moreover, the issue in Harvey was causation, not intent.
Appellent did not deny that he severely spanked the child. Rather,
he sought to show that the child was in the custody of his mother
immediately preceding his injuries, and that she could have been
88
the agent of his death. 1
The State also argued that the evidence was admissible to show
the harm was not the result of accident or inadvertence. The court
conceded that evidence of prior misconduct is properly admissible
to refute such a claim, but pointed out that appellant did not raise
this claim. The evidence was therefore inadmissible for this
purpose. Since the evidence was not admissible for any of the
permissible purposes advanced by the State, the court held it was

179. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). For the text of Rule 404(b) see supra note 167. The first sentence of
Rule 404(b) is a particularized statement of the general rule prohibiting use ofcharacter evidence to
show propensity. Id.
180. Id. Reference here is to the second sentence of Rule 404(b). For the text of Rule 404(b) see
supra note 167.
181. See supra note 167.
182. Id. See also Case Note, Evidence, supra note 175, at 774-75.
183. 604 P.2d 586 (Alaska 1979).
184. Case Note, Evidence, supra note 175, at 778-79.
185. Harvey v. State, 604 P.2d 586, 588, 590 (Alaska 1979).
186. Id. at 589. Appellant was indicated for manslaughter and negligent homicide but was
acquitted on the manslaughter charge. Id. at 588.
187. Id. at 589.
188. Id. at 588-90.
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improperly admitted and constituted reversible error. 18 9
The court in Harvey and the commentator critical of the
Wyoming court's decision in Grabill'9 view Rule 404(b) as first and
foremost a rule of exclusion. Exceptions to the Rule should be
rarely considered and cautiously applied due to the high risk of
prejudice. They reject the view that the defendant's plea in a case,
the posture he assumes at trial, or inferences drawn from his
testimony operate to put matters such as identity, intent, or
absence of mistake or accident into issue. 19 1 Rather, they look for
positive action such as raising accident as a defense, denying that
the injury was inflicted intentionally, or claiming lack of knowledge
before the defendant might be said to have placed such matters in
issue.
Most courts, however, seem to follow the view of the Grabill
court that Rule 404(b) is an inclusionary rule, providing that
evidence of character is admissible for certain purposes. 192 This
view does not require admissibility of such evidence to depend
upon a claim of accident, lack of intent, or any other matter
mentioned in the Rule. The nature of the case and the other
evidence introduced determine whether one of these matters is in
issue.193 Moreover, while the court should inquire into whether
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of prejudice,
need for the evidence is a permissible consideration to be weighed
194
on the side of probative value.
While character evidence of the above-described kind has
usually been admitted, a second kind of character evidence has
routinely been rejected. Evidence of the latter kind consists of
expert testimony on the "battering parent profile," accompanied
by testimony that the defendant fits the profile of the battering
parent. 195 Such evidence contrasts with expert testimony on the
189. Id. at 590.
190. See supra note 175.
191. Harvey, 604 P.2d at 589-90; Case Note, Evidence, supra note 175, at 777-85. Cf McMichael
v. State, 94 Nev. 184, 577 P.2d 398 (1978) (the defendant's plea of not guilty placed intent and
absence of mistake in issue).
192. See State v. Tucker, 181 Conn. 406, 435 A.2d 986 (1980) (evidence of such prior acts as
shaking a child violently is admissible to establish a pattern of behavior that indicates state of mind);
People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 304 N.E.2d 358, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657 (1973) (evidence of parent's
prior abusive acts was admissible to show absence of accident or mistake); State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d
539 (Utah 1983) (evidence of other wrongs, relevant to prove some material fact other than to show
general disposition, is admissible); State v. Forsyth, 641 P.2d 1172 (Utah 1982) (the list contained in
Rule 404(b) is illustrative only, and character evidence is admissible when relevant to prove any
material fact).
193. See State v. Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 545-46 (Utah 1983); Huddleston v. State, 695 P.2d 8
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985).
194. Tanner, 675 P.2d at 547. For a general description of the balancing analysis a court uses
when determining whether to admit character evidence, see MCCORMICK, supra note 66, at 544-48.
195. See, e.g., State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58. 62-63 (Minn. 1981).
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"battered child syndrome," which is admissible on the issue of
cause of death or injuries to the child-victim. 196 "Battering parent"
evidence is evidence of the defendant's character, and its only
relevance lies in demonstrating the positive matchup between the
defendant and the battering parent profile. Moreoever, "battering
parent" evidence is propensity evidence of the kind prohibited
under Rule 404(a) and similar rules. In a leading case, State v.
Loebach, 197 the court held such evidence inadmissible for the same
reasons character evidence to show propensity is usually held
inadmissible:
First, there is the possibility that the jury will convict a
defendant in order to penalize him for his past misdeeds
or simply because he is an undesirable person. Second,
there is the danger that a jury will over-value the
character evidence in assessing the guilt for the crime
charged. Finally, it is unfair to require an accused to be
prepared not only to defend against immediate charges,
but also to disprove or explain his personality or prior
actions. 198
For these reasons the court in Loebach held that "battering
parent" evidence is inadmissible unless the defendant first puts his
character in issue. 199 Other courts uniformly agree with the Loebach
decision. 20 0 An interesting variation is found in State v. Maule'2 0 ' in
which a Washington appellate court held it error to allow an

employee of a sexual assault center to testify that perpetrators of
most assaults on children in their program were male parent
figures, usually biological fathers, where the defendant was the
father of the eight-year-old victim. 2 0 2 A further interesting point is
that in all but one 20 3 of the latter cases, the courts held that use of
196. See, e.g., id.; State v. Wilkerson, 295 N.C. 559, 247 S.E.2d 905 (1978); State v. Tanner,
675 P.2d 539 (Utah 1983).
197. 310 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1981).
198. State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1981) (citing State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn.
488, 139 N.W.2d 167 (1965)).
199. Id. at 64.
200. See, e.g., Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. 70, 76, 303 S.E.2d 13, 18 (1983) ("battering parent"
evidence would be admissible if the defendant raises a defense to which such evidence would be
relevant in rebuttal); Duley v. State, 56 Md. App. 275,
-,
467 A.2d 776, 779-80 (1983)
("battering parent profile" evidence is not relevant to culpability, and thus is not admissible). If the
defendant puts his character in issue, "battering parent" evidence would appear proper under Rule
404(b). See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201.35 Wash. App. 287,667 P.2d 96 (1983).
202. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983).
203. See id. In Maule the court held that admission of prejudicial character evidence constituted
reversible error. Id. at
. 667 P.2d at 99-101

224

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

character evidence was harmless error in light of the overwhelming
evidence of the defendant's guilt. 20 4 As a general rule, then, use of
character evidence has not affected the outcome of cases to any
appreciable degree.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to review three separate developments
related to child abuse today: the changing concept of child abuse as
evidenced by current statutes that give it an ever-expanding
definition; the most current efforts to measure the incidence of
abuse and some of the difficulties limiting accurate measurement;
and some of the most controversial and problematical evidentiary
issues confronting the courts in reviewing child abuse determinations by lower courts. Except in a very limited way, no
attempt has been made to propose solutions to some of the
problems reviewed. 20 5 That task remains to others. The author's
purpose has instead been to give the reader a fuller understanding
of the nature and -scope of child abuse and how they relate indirectly
to the actual handling of child abuse cases by the courts. How much
human behavior is defined as child abuse determines how many
cases of abuse are measured as such. This determines in large part
how many cases actually reach the courts. As more cases reach the
courts, courts - and legislatures - will have a better opportunity
to resolve evidentiary questions based on a firmer understanding of
20 6
the child abuse phenomenon itself.

204. See Sanders v. State, 251 Ga. at 76-77, 303 S.E.2d at 18; Duley v. State, 56 Md: App. at
283, 467 A.2d at 783; State v. Loebach, 310 N.W.2d at 64.
205. To the extent solutions were mentioned they were solutions proposed by others. See supra
notes 84-91, 110-15 and accompanying text.
206. As more child abuse cases reach the courts, legislatures will have the opportunity to resolve
evidentiary questions by enacting legislation controlling admissiblity of children's out-of-court
statements based on a better understanding of children's credibility versus that of adults. In
Washington, for example, the legislature recently enacted a hearsay exception applicable to sexual
abuse cases. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text. Courts similarly can reach more
informed decisions on the competency of children to testify based on a better understanding of the
psychology of victims of traumatic crime, particularly child victims of sexual offenses. See supra notes
75-79 and accompanying text. Courts can also make more informed decisions on the admissibility of
character evidence based on increased awareness of policy considerations and whether there is a
genuine "need" for such evidence. See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying text.

